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1 Hierarchical restrictions on coalition formation
Van den Brink’s excellent survey brings together many established insights of how the exercise of
hierarchical authority aects the allocation of generated wealth among cooperative participants
in the hierarchy. In particular, the survey considers the eects of three dierent institutional rules
through which authority is exercised. Under the conjunctive permission rule, every player has to
obtain permission from all her superiors to participate in value-generating processes. is implies
that coalitions are only formable if they contain all (direct and indirect) superiors of its members.
e disjunctive permission rule imposes that players obtain permission from at least one superior,
limiting the authority that these superiors can exercise. Finally, under the local permission rule, the
scope of authority is reduced further in that players only have to obtain permission from their direct
superiors to participate in such value-generating processes. In this laer environment, authority is
exercised directly only rather than directly and indirectly as is the case under the conjunctive and
disjunctive permission rules.
ese permission rules can be represented as imposing certain restrictions on coalition formation,
particularly captured through an antimatroid—dened as a collection of formable coalitions in the
player set N that is closed under taking nite unions and satises accessibility.1 In particular, under
the conjunctive permission rule, the antimatroid is additionally closed under nite intersections. Sim-
ilarly, the disjunctive permission rule imposes certain other additional properties on the antimatroid
of formable coalitions.
In the axiomatic theories considered in this survey, the permission rules are not considered from
the viewpoint of facilitating cooperation, but rather from the viewpoint that these rules restrict
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BT9 5EE, UK. Email: r.gilles@qub.ac.uk
1A collection of formable coalitions is accessible if for every formable coalition E , ∅, there exists i ∈ E such that
E \ {i} is formable as well.
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or hinder such cooperation. e transferable utility game thus represents the values that could be
generated through free cooperation among the players, while the antimatroid of formable coalitions
imposes restrictions on cooperation and makes certain value generating processes inaccessible to
these players.
One natural question that arises within the context of these theories is why such hierarchical
authority structures—represented by these three institutional permission rules—would emerge.
Why are such hierarchical authority structures so prevalent in our societies if they are mainly
restricting accessibility to value generating processes? e answer to this question has to be that
these hierarchical authority structures and permission rules actually facilitate the generation of
economic values through cooperation rather than hinder it.2
ere are two types of hierarchical structures in which authority is exercised in a similar fashion
as described in the three institutional permission rules discussed in this survey. e rst type is that
of social hierarchies that have been prevalent in human societies since the onset of the emergence of
Homo Sapiens. Second, since the industrial revolution there have emerged hierarchically structure
social production organizations, also known as rms or corporations. In both types of organizational
structure, authority is exercised through instructions and commands from hierarchical superiors to
hierarchical subordinates.
Below I discuss both types of hierarchical organization structures and their function as facilitators
of economic value generating processes. I conclude by drawing some conclusions for a research
agenda for the full development of mathematical models of such organizations.
2 e role of hierarchies in the social economy
Social hierarchies are arrangements among economic decision makers in which social standing
allows the exercise of authority by socially higher ranked individuals over socially lower ranked
individuals. ere is signicant evidence that such social hierarchies form the backbone of economic
communities throughout human history (Graeber, 2011; Bowles & Choi, 2013, 2016; Bowles, 2015).
Particularly, these social hierarchies introduce institutional frameworks that impose stability in the
economy’s wealth generation processes. Stoelhorst & Richerson (2013) and Kaufman (2003) point out
that institutional rules and social guides, which prescribe the domains of socio-economic decision
making, act as stabilizers that facilitate well-functioning economic wealth generating processes.
Gilles et al. (2015) show through a formal model of a network economy that institutional arrange-
ments based on social hierarchical leadership restrict interactions among players appropriately to
facilitate the emergence of a stable state in the economy and the wealth generating processes that it
encapsulates. In this model economic agents are able to act as market makers and to create markets
as trade platforms in a given network of trade or social relationships. Social hierarchies provide the
2e cooperative nature of the human economy has been emphasised throughout history. I refer to, e.g., Plato (2007),
Seabright (2010), Bowles & Gintis (2011) and Sun (2012) for empirical support of human sociality and the history of these
ideas.
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required conditions on the allowable interactions in the network to guarantee the emergence of the
required stability to form such platforms in the maximally eective and ecient fashion.
Technically, Gilles et al. (2015) show that these hierarchical authority arrangements exclude the
emergence of Condorcet-type cycles in the interaction structures that obstruct the stability of the
formed platforms. us, hierarchical authority prevents inconsequential, cyclic decision making
by blocking the formation of such cycles. is analysis can be extended to include other forms
of socio-economic cooperation structures, in particular social arrangements in which hierarchical
authority is exercised locally (Lazarova, 2006).
In related research, Piccione & Rubinstein (2007) refer to the sheer eciency of social hierar-
chical arrangements in the trade of commodities. Graeber (2011) points out that such hierarchical
arrangements have been prevalent in hunter-gatherer societies and are closely tied to the presence
of debt arrangements in such societies. Both refer to such social hierarchies as eective institutional
arrangements to achieve ecient socio-economic states in a community of human cooperators.
In the incorporated, capitalist economy that arose aer the industrial revolution, the benecial
role of hierarchical social production organizations—or “rms”—has been less well understood. Coase
(1937) seminally pointed out that hierarchical production organizations facilitate the reduction of
transaction and networking costs. In that regard, rms act as collective shelters against the costs
of market making and relationship building. is is captured in the multi-faceted and incomplete
nature of the employment relationship.
More recently, research has turned to understanding enhanced property rights as the main
institutional innovation that facilitated the rise of rms and the incorporated, capitalist economy
(Hart & Moore, 1990, 1999). is has parallels with the emergence of social hierarchies aer the
introduction of agricultural property rights during the agricultural revolution as argued by Bowles
& Choi (2013) and Bowles (2015).
Finally, I point out that hierarchies can be viewed as eective information processing structures.
is approach is closely related to the theory of decentralized computing and has been seminally
developed by Radner (1992, 1993) and Van Zandt & Radner (2001). is approach is founded on the
hypothesis that workers are endowed with limited capabilities to process information and need to
be organized in hierarchical structures to process signicant quantities of data and make eective
decisions.
3 Topics for further research
From this discussion there emerge a number of pertinent and deep research questions that relate to
the cooperative game theory of hierarchical permission structures as surveyed by van den Brink.
• ere are strong indications that hierarchical authority has signicant benets for the stable
generation of economic wealth. Could one formulate a mathematical, game theoretical
framework that clearly identies the causes of this feature? is would require the modelling
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of economic wealth creation processes through cooperative games—as surveyed here—and,
additionally, the mathematical formulation of the costs of networking and making transactions.
Hierarchical constraints on free interaction should ideally lead to stability and more successful
wealth creation. e models outlined in Coase (1937) and Gilles et al. (2015), enhanced by the
models surveyed by van den Brink, could function as guides for such a development.
• Second, as pointed out above, there are indications that social hierarchies as well as hier-
archically structured rms are founded on institutional property rights. e mathematical
modelling of property rights has been recognized as extremely dicult. However, the method-
ology used in the approach of cooperative games with permission structures might be a
welcome guide to model property rights more precisely. is has been aempted in Brink &
Gilles (2016) for the case of arbitrarily complex hierarchies of principal-agent relationships.
Further development of similar models could bring new insights into the nature of the rm as
well as social hierarchies.
• ere is a third research question emerging from this short overview of approaches to the
benets from the exercise of hierarchical authority. Indeed, if hierarchies are also eective due
to the bounded abilities and rationality of human decision makers, then the merging of these
features to hierarchies and their understanding from the idea of socio-economic institutions
such as property rights should eventually result in a rather complete perspective on why
hierarchies exist in human societies and economies. is clearly is a question that seems
to be the most dicult to answer. However, it is clear that the use of cooperative games to
describe the fundamental wealth generating processes in these hierarchies is mandated to
even contemplating this question.
In this comment I have argued for a very broad and positive perspective on the use of cooperative
game theory to understand why hierarchies are so prevalent in human economic wealth creation
processes. e theories surveyed by van den Brink should form the foundation for such expanded
eorts and support the development of mathematical approaches to institutional and organizational
explanations of how human economies are structured.
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